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Section 4: Paper 9 
 
Exploitation as a Path to Development: 
Sweatshop Labour, Micro-Unfairness, and the Non-Worseness Claim 
 
Michael Randall Barnes 
Georgetown University 
 
Abstract: Sweatshop labour is sometimes defended from critics by arguments that stress the 
voluntariness of the worker’s choice, and the fact that sweatshops provide a source of income 
where no other similar source exists. The idea is if it’s exploitation—as their opponents charge—
it’s mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation. This defence appeals to the non-worseness 
claim (NWC), which says that if exploitation is better for the exploited party than neglect, it 
cannot be seriously wrong. The NWC renders otherwise exploitative—and therefore morally 
wrong—transactions permissible, making the exploitation of the global poor a justifiable path to 
development. In this paper, I argue that the use of NWC for the case of sweatshops is misleading. 
After reviewing and strengthening the exploitation claims made concerning sweatshops, most 
importantly by refuting certain allegations that a micro-unfairness account of exploitation cannot 
evaluate sweatshop labour as exploitative, I then argue that even if this practice may be seen as  
permissible due to benefits otherwise unavailable to the global poor, there remains a duty to 
address the background conditions that make this form of wrong-doing possible. I argue that the 
NWC denies this by unreasonably limiting its scope and is therefore incomplete, and ultimately 
unconvincing. 
 
Introduction 
Perhaps the most common objection made against low-wage (sweatshop) labour1  is that 
their owners and operators—often large multi-national enterprises (MNEs) and their 
subcontractors2—wrongly exploit their workers and the desperate situation they find themselves 
in. Low pay, long hours, and hazardous conditions can combine with impressive corporate 
profits to give intuitive appeal to the exploitation claim, which will be refined below. In defence 
of sweatshops however, it’s sometimes stressed that they are often the best option available to 
their employees, and that this is signalled by the workers voluntarily accepting the job’s 
conditions over work in another setting, or unemployment. It’s argued that to take any action that 
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might remove this option from the potential workers, such as boycotts or stronger regulations, 
can plausibly be considered harming them rather than helping them, if it puts jobs at risk. 
While there are far too many questions raised by sweatshops for me to cover in a single 
paper—with many being empirical—my focus here will be on the exploitation claim and its 
moral significance. There is, however, debate within the exploitation literature about the 
concept’s applicability for the case of sweatshops. It is within this debate that my paper is 
situated. 
In this paper, I argue for two main claims. First, in Part 2 I address a recurring criticism 
that micro-fairness approaches to exploitation cannot adequately account for background 
injustices and are for this reason unable to evaluate sweatshops as exploitative. This is often 
taken as justification for embracing a macro-fairness account. I argue, however, that this 
criticism is based on a misunderstanding of the micro-fairness approach and its intent. In doing 
so, I also highlight a troublesome defect of the macro-fairness views that gives us reason to resist 
their adoption. 
Having strengthened the case that sweatshops are in fact exploitative, in Part 3, I consider 
the moral force of exploitation claims, that is, what they say we should do about exploitation. In 
particular I examine this in the context of background injustice. I then show how the typical 
defence of sweatshops appeals to what’s known as the non-worseness claim (NWC), which says 
that if exploitation is better for the exploited party than neglect, and neglect is itself a permissible 
option, then exploitation cannot be seriously wrong.3 Sweatshop exploitation, then, would be 
considered a justifiable path to development for many countries. I argue, however, that the NWC 
implicitly endorses a minimalist view of responsibilities, one that I see as inadmissible in the 
case of sweatshops because of its problematic dismissal of background injustice. To endorse this 
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view, as defenders of sweatshops do when they use the NWC, is to ignore rather than respond to 
the complaint of exploitation, or so I will argue. 
First, however, in Part 1, I summarize the area of agreement concerning the concept of 
exploitation as it’s now usually discussed. This will include a description of mutually beneficial 
and consensual exploitation—meaning that harm and coercion are not necessary elements of 
exploitation as I, and most other writers, see it.  
The result of this paper, then, is an analytical separation of micro-fairness accounts of 
exploitation, which in my view are the most defensible, from the minimalist view of 
responsibilities implicit in the NWC, which I argue, at least in the case of sweatshops, is morally 
suspect. In this way I hope to clear up the debate within the exploitation literature and locate the 
points of tension for further inquiry. 
 
Part 1 
 In the most general sense, for one party, A, to wrongfully exploit another, B,4 means that 
A has taken advantage of B in a way that is somehow unfair or degrading. 5  Nearly everyone 
who writes on exploitation can agree to this preliminary definition.6 Where the many theories on 
offer diverge is in their emphasis on either unfairness or degradation as primary, and in how they 
flesh out the details more precisely. Before examining these differences, however, the broad area 
of agreement shared by the majority of these theories should be stressed. 
 First, it ‘s usually agreed that exploiters must gain from their exploitation, that is, they 
must derive some benefit from their victims. This seems to be the straightforward result of 
understanding exploitation as a form of taking advantage; thus, if there is no advantage taken, 
it’s difficult to see how there can be exploitation.7 This feature, the benefit to A, is in part what 
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distinguishes exploitation from oppression and other forms of wrongdoing. Alan Wertheimer 
suggests that  “A oppresses B when A deprives B of freedoms or opportunities to which B is 
entitled. If A gains from the oppressive relationship, as when A enslaves B, then A may both 
oppress and exploit B. But there is no reason to think that A always gains from oppression, and 
when A does not gain, there is no reason to regard the oppression as exploitative.”8 
 Following through with this idea, but turning our attention now to the victims of 
exploitation, it’s clearly true that being exploited often means being harmed, understood in the 
sense that one’s interests are set back. This is what happens when A enslaves B. Whereas A 
gains from B’s enslavement, B is clearly harmed. But this is not necessary. For, even if a 
transaction is beneficial for both A and B, it’s still possible for it to be somehow unfair or 
degrading, and thus exploitative according to our standing definition. In this way we can 
distinguish harmful exploitation from mutually beneficial exploitation. And while there can be 
little doubt that harmful exploitation such as slavery is morally wrong, the matter is a bit more 
complicated when B gains, and yet the transaction still seems somehow unfair or degrading. 
 Consider the following examples: 
Snowstorm:  A is a tow truck driver who happens along B, a motorist stranded in a ditch 
during a snowstorm. Ordinarily, A charges $10 for a simple rescue like this one. But for 
whatever reason, A offers to only assist B for a fee of $200, take it or leave it. B, who we 
can imagine is under no immediate threat, still does not wish to wait for another tow 
truck, decides to pay the $200.9 
 
Overboard: While walking along the deck of a cruise ship, A spots B, who has fallen 
overboard. A offers to throw B a life preserver only on condition that she sign away 75% 
of all her future earnings over to A. B, none too thrilled about the terms of this offer, still 
accepts as she nevertheless values her life over the income she trades for it. 10 
 
 This last point is worthy of emphasis. While it may strike us as intuitively unfair that B 
pay such a large sum for A’s services, it’s just as easy to see that B has nonetheless gained from 
the transaction as compared to her pre-transaction status. Thus harm is not a necessary ingredient 
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for exploitative transactions. This also leads us to the further idea that exploitation can be fully 
voluntary, at least in the sense of being free of outright coercion. Insofar as exploitation can be 
mutually beneficial, it’s then sometimes rational for B to agree to A’s terms, even though unfair. 
Some writers have denied this aspect of voluntariness, and have argued that the key, necessary 
element of exploitation is B’s rationality being compromised.11 The overboard example may 
seem to fall into this category, as B’s circumstances hardly put her in the best position to 
evaluate A’s terms.  
However, it still looks possible to say that given her vulnerable circumstances in both 
Overboard and the milder case of the Snowstorm, compared to the no-transaction option, it’s in 
B’s interest to acquiesce to A’s demands, and it might even be irrational for her not to do so. I 
agree with Matt Zwolinski when he says, “[t]o the extent that it is unfair or degrading to take 
advantage of another persons’ vulnerability, then, voluntariness and unfairness are not only 
logically compatible, they will often go hand in hand.”12 This is not to deny that difficult 
situations can put an agent in a precarious position in terms of what she might consent to. It’s 
rather that questions of B’s consent hardly end matters, and solve less than they appear. 
 Suppose B’s car breaks down and she desperately needs a new battery. If A, the only 
mechanic in town, offers to sell B a battery at the same price that she would have paid had she 
gone in better circumstances, at the same price everyone else pays, and at the same price she 
would pay to any other mechanic, this hardly seems like an exploitative transaction and B’s 
arguable compromised consent changes our moral assessment of the transaction very little. 
However, had A recognized B was in such a situation and decided to double the price, the charge 
of exploitation might then seem appropriate. Exploitation, it appears, depends more on a defect 
in the terms of the transaction than on possible defects in B’s consent. 
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These defects in consent are certainly not irrelevant, however. I should note that their 
importance seems to depend in part on which approach to defining exploitation—unfairness or 
degradation—is taken. On an unfairness model, problems in B’s consent are seen to play more of 
a role in determining how we ought to respond to exploitation, which can be defined 
independently, purely in terms of the outcome of the transaction.13 On the approach that 
exploitation is primarily degrading, defects in consent will carry greater weight since the 
emphasis is more on the process that gives rise to exploitative terms.14 This approach can be 
fleshed out in a number of ways, yet in most cases the intuitive idea is that certain transactions 
are inherently lacking in respect, such as the purchase of  reproductive labour, or organs. This, in 
turn, is usually grounded in Kantian ideas of autonomy and respect.15 This approach faces an 
initial difficulty, however, as one interpretation of Kant’s maxim against using one as a mere 
means suggests one violates this duty only when one treats “him in a way to which he could not 
possibly consent.”16 Cases of coercion and fraud would fall under this heading, but as we have 
seen, there appear to be genuine cases of exploitation where B appears to give her full consent, 
and where it is rational for her to do so. This difficulty can of course be overcome, and the work 
Wood and Sample referenced above is a testament to just that. 
Ultimately, however, I am more confident in an unfairness account providing a more 
plausible conception of exploitation. This is largely because of considerations that come from the 
micro versus macro-fairness debate, which I will turn to below. For now, it can simply be noted 
that at least when it comes to the question of sweatshop labour, degradation-based approaches 
can themselves be considered as types of macro-fairness accounts of exploitation. While these 
have the benefit of having little difficulty describing sweatshop labour as exploitative, I will 
argue that this comes at a high cost. Unfairness models, on the other hand, often fall into the 
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category of micro-fairness accounts. These, in contrast, are sometimes said to be unable to 
explain sweatshops as exploitative because they exclude certain background information in their 
moral assessment of transactions. Usually this is considered a defect and a reason to abandon the 
approach—though some writers nevertheless embrace this approach.17 In any case, I will go on 
to refute the claim that micro-fairness views cannot evaluate sweatshops as exploitative. I 
consider this important because it cuts off those who wish to deny that sweatshops are 
exploitative from using what I see as a common misunderstanding of the micro-fairness 
approach in their favour. Moreover, as the micro-fairness view is generally considered a more 
conservative approach, it adds further weight to the claim that sweatshops are a genuine case of 
exploitation, and thus, worthy of further moral analysis. 
 
Part 2 
Before considering the micro versus macro-fairness debate, it is worthwhile to add some 
details to the idea that the wrongfulness of exploitation lies primarily in an element of unfairness. 
In any given transaction, each party has a reservation price, “that is, the value that the person 
must receive if he or she is to agree to the transaction.”18 The range in between the two parties 
reservation prices (if one exists) is the zone of agreement. Recall the snowstorm example. We 
can imagine that A’s reservation price is the $10 she normally charges. Though she would prefer 
to get more for her efforts, she is unwilling to accept any less than that. B’s reservation price will 
depend more on the situation, and it’s probably unlikely that B could accurately predict her 
reservation price until her hand is forced. Let us say, in any case, that B’s reservation price is 
$250. She would rather be stuck in the cold than pay such an outrageous fee. Their zone of 
agreement, then, falls between these two prices—between $10 and $250. A transaction that 
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occurs within this zone of agreement can be thought to generate a social surplus, “which could 
be defined as the difference between the buyer’s and seller’s reservation prices.”19 It is the 
distribution of the social surplus that raises questions of fairness. In our example, A is able to 
push B closer to her reservation price because of her vulnerable situation, and for this reason gets 
a larger share of the social surplus. If B has accurately determined her own reservation price, 
however, then it is reasonable to suppose that she nonetheless still gains from the transaction. 
Mutually beneficial exploitation, then, occurs when both A and B gain relative to the no-
transaction baseline but the distribution of the social surplus is somehow unfair to B. While this 
offers a little more precision to the unfairness account of exploitation, it’s still entirely unclear 
what makes a given distribution unfair. A principle of fairness is therefore required, and the 
distinction between micro and macro approaches can now be examined.20  
While there is no traditional definition that marks the difference between the two 
approaches, Jeremy Snyder suggest that “we can divide fairness-based accounts of exploitation 
into two subgroups: 1) those that do not include concerns about structural justice in the standard 
of fairness (micro fairness) and 2) those that do incorporate concerns about structural justice 
when assessing fairness (macro fairness).”21 The standard example of a micro-fairness account 
comes from Alan Wertheimer. The principle of fairness Wertheimer favours for most cases is 
based on the notion of a hypothetical market price—that is, “the price that an informed and 
unpressured seller would receive from an informed and unpressured buyer.”22 Though certainly 
not the only option for a micro-fairness account, I will focus on this principle since it has 
generated substantial debate—especially concerning the role of background injustice—and is 
often invoked in the sweatshop exploitation literature as a principle that fails to label sweatshops 
as exploitative. 
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The fairness of the hypothetical market price (HMP) is founded in the idea that the 
competitive market price “is a price at which neither party takes special unfair advantage of 
particular defects in the other party’s decision-making capacity or special vulnerabilities in the 
other party’s situation.”23 We can see the appeal of the HMP if we apply it to our earlier 
examples. Had there been two tow truck drivers competing to assist B, it’s likely that neither 
would be able to take advantage of B in the same way when there was only one. The same can be 
said for Overboard. Once A loses her monopoly position on assisting B, she also loses her ability 
to push B to the exploitative price, and must instead offer fair(er) terms if she wishes to transact. 
This is because in a fully competitive market, it is argued, no one can chose to transact at 
anything but the market price.24 Yet when we say that A takes unfair advantage of B, we must 
mean that A could have decided not to do so—as is usual, ought implies can. In this way the 
HMP reflects the potential for fairness in perfectly competitive markets. B might still be the 
victim of a misfortune or injustice, but if A and B transact at this price, then A herself has not 
exploited B, and the distribution of the social surplus is considered fair. 
 Of course, not everyone accepts this criterion of fairness nor the theory of exploitation it 
supports. Ruth Sample criticizes Wertheimer’s theory for being too conservative, and  
understanding exploitation as simply a “failure to adhere to a convention.”25 According to 
Sample, exploitation for Wertheimer essentially means paying a non-standard price. Sample in 
turn argues that sometimes paying a standard price can still be exploitative if proper attention is 
given to background circumstances of the parties, which, she claims, the HMP fails to do.  
Consider the following example from Sample that many hold to be an intuitive case of 
exploitation: 
A factory worker visits a Pacific Rim country and offers to set up a running-shoe 
factory that would pay each worker $2 per day. The current average daily wage in 
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the village is $1, which is enough to prevent a worker and his family from 
starving. The workers will have no benefits other than salary and must work 
eighty hours per week. The workers accept. The running shoes sell for $95 per 
pair in the United States and Western Europe, and half of that price is corporate 
profit.26 
 
Although Sample intended for this to simply be an example that highlights a certain defect in the 
HMP, it does not stray too far from actual conditions in many parts of the developing world. 
Working conditions are often dangerous, with poor ventilation, cramped spaces, and a severe 
lack of safety measures. Typical shifts can last over ten hours a day, six days a week, and 
overtime is commonly forced and unpaid. The majority of the workers are women, and sexual 
harassment is widespread. Efforts by employees to improve conditions through protest or 
unionizing are often met with intimidation, beatings, and firings. Health care and other benefits 
are a dream. And while wages are low, typically well below the stated minimum wage, they are, 
as in the example, still higher than the local average wage.27 
Before responding to Sample’s argument in detail, some more general remarks can be 
made. Sample’s own account of sweatshop exploitation is helpful in showing the link between 
macro-fairness accounts and theories of exploitation as degradation.. Without getting too deep 
into the details, suffice it to say that Sample considers the wrongness of exploitation to include 
cases where we “fail to respect a person by taking advantage of an injustice done to him [or 
her]”28 While this account ties the wrongness of exploitation to a failure to respect rather than 
unfairness, and can thus properly be considered a case of exploitation as degradation, it’s the 
action of taking advantage of the unfairness created by an injustice that constitutes a failure of 
respect.29 Profiting from sweatshop labour in the face of extreme poverty qualifies as an instance 
of taking advantage of injustice for Sample, and sweatshops are then easily evaluated as 
exploitative on this macro-fairness account. 
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Unfortunately however, it seems that this approach takes us too far. According to it, not 
only would sweatshops be considered exploitative but so would any business operating in the 
developing world. This is the case because of a distinction that seems largely ignored by macro-
fairness accounts, but that micro-fairness accounts take very seriously, i.e., the difference 
between taking advantage of unfairness and taking unfair advantage of unfairness.30 A case of 
the former might be when a contractor rebuilds a home destroyed by arson, but still charges the 
owner a fair fee. Though the contractor gains from an injustice, it might be a stretch to say she is 
taking unfair advantage of the owner.31 Of course if she were to suddenly raise the price to an 
excessive level, preying on the owner’s vulnerable situation, she might then be guilty of taking 
unfair advantage of unfairness, and thus exploiting the owner. But this would be because of an 
unfairness that manifests in the terms of the transaction, and not simply in the background. By 
linking exploitation so strictly to the idea of gaining from injustice, macro-fairness accounts like 
Sample’s make background injustice a sufficient cause for exploitation. This does not seem 
tenable, however, as benefiting from misfortune does not always seem inherently wrong. 
 Snyder suggests that a “micro-fairness [account] attempts to limit the scope of the 
standard of fairness, typically by excluding concerns about the effects of structural justice on the 
distribution of benefits resulting from an interaction.”32 While it may be possible to construct a 
principle of fairness that limits itself in this way—though I do not see how that could be 
considered fair—it’s hardly a requirement of the micro-fairness approach. The rationale for 
adopting a micro approach, such as the HMP, is not to purposively ignore any effects of 
structural or background causes as Snyder claims; rather, it aims to have a clearer focus on 
effects by bracketing their cause to an extent. Recall Overboard, in trying to determine if A is 
exploiting the drowning B, it seems to matter very little whether B fell in the water due to bad 
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luck, fecklessness, or injustice.33 Unless A pushed B in, of course, the unfairness of A’s 
exploitation then depends more on the desperation of B’s circumstances than its history.34 This 
follows straightforwardly from recognizing that just because an agreement arises out of an unfair 
or unjust background, this does not necessarily mean the terms will also be unfair. This does not 
deny, however, that structural injustice or background unfairness might lead an agent to accept 
unfair terms and be exploited.35 
 In more detail now, Sample’s trouble with the HMP lies in the fact that there is 
undoubtedly a competitive market for labour in developing countries, but since there are more 
workers than capitalists, the price for labour is low. She says that “competitive markets are set by 
supply and demand, and if a person has a monopoly on a resource—such as employment—this 
may drive demand and thus prices up.”36  She then claims that “since the competitive market 
price is the nonexploitative price, it follows that the workers are not being exploited.” 
The problem with this argument, however, is clear. Sample conflates the mere existence 
of a market with the conditions of a hypothetical market. This misunderstanding in the way that 
the HMP is meant to abstract away from actual markets is crucial. While Wertheimer is not 
entirely precise in what might define the HMP, he does compare it to the price set by a fairly 
conducted market “in the absence of fraud, monopoly, or coercion.”37 This implies that the mere 
presence of market does not guarantee the standard price is a fair one.38 Though the market for 
labour in the developing world is competitive in a certain sense, with potential labourers 
competing for employment, in another it drifts close, as Sample acknowledges, to a monopoly. 
And as we have seen, the monopoly position is crucial for many cases of exploitation. 
 However, it’s not strictly true that the labour market in developing countries is a 
monopoly. Moreover, the HMP cannot simply be the perfectly competitive market price in a 
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strict sense either, as this would mean any and all profits are exploitative. The HMP is then 
vague with respect to exactly what features of actual markets it abstracts away from. Yet, in any 
case, it’s important to recognize that exploitation on the HMP view is not simply a matter of 
paying a nonstandard price, as Sample characterizes it. Even in the presence of an accepted 
market price, exploitation can still occur when the terms are sufficiently unlike the terms of a 
hypothetical market, whatever that may be.39 
Thus, while it’s true that critics of sweatshop labour tend not to make their case based 
solely on intuitions regarding the unfairness of cheap labour, but rather on the unfairness of 
certain contingent facts about  global poverty and international trade as it is currently practiced—
such as commodity dumping, forced liberalization, unfavourable labour laws, basic needs 
deprivation, etc40—the claim is perhaps best understood as criticizing the influence these factors 
can have on the terms to which sweatshop workers might agree. Background and structural 
unfairness can clearly create the conditions for exploitation. Even though a micro-fairness 
account is concerned with the terms, and not necessarily the circumstances, of the transaction, it 
should not be surprising when structural unfairness leads to unfair terms. In this way we can 
consider unjust background conditions as not sufficient for exploitation, but as playing an 
evidentiary role. Consequently, it’s quite plausible that even on a micro-fairness account such as 
a HMP, desperate sweatshop workers are pushed towards their reservation prices and are 
therefore exploited.41 There is then no need to abandon the micro-fairness account in favour of a 
troublesome macro approach. Moreover, those who deny sweatshops are exploitative will need 
to provide a novel and convincing argument for why the effects of background factors on the 
terms of the transaction should be ignored, though I do not see how they could.42 
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Part 3 
Exploitation in our sense is a moralized concept. Exploitative transactions are morally 
wrong because unfair or degrading. Yet, regardless of which model of exploitation we endorse, 
correctly calling a practice “exploitative” hardly puts an end to all moral concerns. In the above, 
I argued that micro-fairness accounts of exploitation are capable of evaluating transactions 
occurring against a backdrop of unfairness as themselves unfair, even while maintaining their 
focus on transactions in and of themselves. However, as I will soon explain, this alone does not 
determine how we ought to respond to exploitative transactions. In this section I will argue that 
assessments of the permissibility of exploitative transactions seem to require a direct reference to 
background factors that the determination of exploitation alone does not. Moreover, I will argue 
that the common defence of sweatshops fails to do so in a sufficient way. First, however, it’s 
useful to analyse the moral force of exploitation claims in more detail. 
We have already seen some cases of exploitation that intuitively ought not to be 
prohibited. In Overboard, it’s unlikely that prohibiting the transaction would be the appropriate 
or desired solution. While it may be unfair that B pay so much for A’s assistance, it does not 
appear as though forbidding A from exploiting B necessarily helps matters. Similarly for the 
Snowstorm example. That exploitation ought to be sometimes permitted should be no big 
surprise, as our focus throughout has been on mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation. 
Both respect for B as a decision maker, and an interest in B’s welfare can lead us to this answer. 
What may be surprising, however, is how unjust background conditions may seem to strengthen 
this idea.  
Considering that B finds herself in already unjust circumstances, there are substantial 
risks involved in ignoring the benefits to B in our moral assessment. If there is the risk that A 
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will not offer fair terms to a desperate B, then to deny B the chance to improve her situation by 
being voluntarily exploited is akin to kicking someone while they are down. 
It’s a result of these considerations that sweatshop exploitation is put forth as a justifiable 
path to development. Nicholas Kristof makes this point clear when he says that “The central 
challenge in the poorest countries is not that sweatshops exploit too many people, but that they 
don’t exploit enough.”43 This defence of sweatshops embodies what is called the non-worseness 
claim (NWC), which states that if it is morally acceptable for A not to transact with B, then A’s 
mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation of B cannot be seriously wrong, and should be 
permitted. In one form or another, the NWC lies at the core of most defences of sweatshop 
labour, and it’s easy to see why. Clearly no business is truly obligated to open factories in the 
developing world, and, when combined with the idea that a bad job is better than no job, this 
suggests that sweatshop labour is indeed justified according to the NWC. 
Zwolinski explicitly endorses the NWC claim in his analysis of  exploitation and 
sweatshops.44 He argues that the NWC generates a claim of non-interference, barring any efforts 
that might render sweatshop labour a non-permissible option. This is designed to include 
consumer boycott groups, non-government organizations, governments themselves, and any who 
claim that their aim is the welfare of sweatshop workers. The idea is that when businesses lose 
the incentive to operate in a developing country and employ the workers they do, they will be 
forced to fire employees or even leave completely, which eliminates even the small pay the 
workers now receive. To criticize MNEs, and argue that wages or working conditions should be 
improved, thus puts workers in harm’s way, as the threat of neglect is legitimate and permissible.  
On the basis of the above, Zwolinski claims it is incoherent to criticize MNEs who 
exploit their employees yet still provide them with some benefit, while at the same time fail to 
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criticize other MNEs who do not outsource and thus provide no benefit. Zwolinski asks, “[h]ow, 
then, can it be permissible to neglect workers in the developing world, but impermissible to 
exploit them, when exploitation is better for both parties (including workers who are in desperate 
need of betterment)?”45 
 There is no doubt some truth to the NWC, and many examples of exploitation fit into its 
reasoning well enough. Consider the price-gouging shop owner who doubles the price of shovels 
when an unexpected snowstorm hits town. While we may still call this transaction unfair and 
exploitative, we may stop short of calling it a serious moral wrong, precisely for the reasons the 
NWC brings forward, that is, neither party’s obligation to transact, plus the benefits each 
receives if that person does. 
Yet it strikes many as odd that the identification of sweatshops as exploitative would lead 
to their unconditional permissibility, as Zwolinski see it. This is likely because of the relevant 
dissimilarities between sweatshops and the above price-gouging example. While they both share 
the common features of mutually beneficial exploitation, in the case of sweatshops, however, we 
are drawn to the potential employee’s desperation and inability to reject the offer in a much 
greater degree than in the shovel example. The cause of this desperation, moreover, is different 
in a significant way from an unexpected snowstorm, as the former stems from injustice.46 
 In the previous section I argued that a micro-fairness account of exploitation need not 
ignore the effects of injustice as is sometimes claimed. What I believe does ignore background 
injustice in a troublesome way, however, is the minimalist view of responsibilities implicit in the 
NWC.47 This minimalist view attempts to abstain from difficult questions of justice by limiting 
its attention to the terms of the transaction. Yet, in doing so, it implicitly accepts the status quo as 
an appropriately just baseline. This is apparent in the NWC’s narrow focus on the gains of the 
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parties, and mutual voluntariness, these being the only parameters with which it is concerned. 
What is excluded, however, is crucial information including the relative positions of the parties 
and their histories. That information such as this is necessary for a full and satisfactory account 
of the morality and possible permissibility of exploitative transactions becomes evident when we 
consider the relevance of what is excluded by the minimalist view. 
While I cannot offer a full defence here, I believe a strong argument can be, and has been 
made that the conditions the global poor find themselves in are at least partly the result of 
continued unjust acts of the developed world.48 The strongest reason to support this claim rests 
on the fact that the structure of the global economy has tremendous, and often detrimental, 
effects on the global poor. Since the developed world is largely able to shape this shared 
institution and practice however it pleases, there is a causal relationship between the unjust 
circumstances sweatshop workers find themselves in and the MNEs and developed world 
citizens who benefit from their labour.49 While it’s a matter of debate how these facts should 
inform novel duties and responsibilities, I can think of no compelling reason why these injustices 
should purposely be ignored in any full account of the moral permissibility of sweatshop labour. 
The minimalist view, along with its expression in the use of the NWC, thus appear insufficient 
for dealing with concerns of exploitation in developing countries as it leaves no conceptual room 
for these issues even to arise. 
I should note that the preceding reveals a distinction that I believe is of particular 
theoretical importance. This is the fact that there are two senses in which background injustices 
can be abstracted away from when assessing transactions: (1) the micro-fairness account of 
exploitation which simply holds that background injustice is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
exploitation to occur, as it is the terms of a transaction themselves which must be unfair for 
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exploitation to occur and (2) a minimalist view that attempts to abstain from broader questions of 
social justice when determining the permissibility of an action, but instead simply accepts the 
status quo as just and excludes morally relevant information. This latter method of abstracting 
from background injustice, because it is especially concerned with the permissibility of actions 
that occur against a backdrop of injustice while choosing to ignore facts about this injustice, 
appears significantly morally suspect for its stated task, or so I argued above.  
In appreciating this distinction along with the questions that it raises, the exploitation 
literature as well as the sweatshop debate can move forward by addressing these questions more 
directly, while avoiding the misunderstandings and problematic arguments that I have 
highlighted in this paper. 
In closing, I would like to reaffirm that there is certainly some truth to the NWC.  Even in 
full recognition of injustice and the responsibilities that arise, its warning should not be ignored. 
For this reason, very few sweatshop critics, including myself, recommend simply closing 
sweatshops by fiat. Rather we must be strategic and perhaps even permit some exploitative 
arrangements if better terms are not forthcoming. This follows naturally from the idea that 
complaints of exploitation are not to be seen as a simple call to prohibit the act regardless of the 
consequences. Rather, they are best seen as a call to investigate and address the background 
circumstances that make exploitation possible. In the case of sweatshops, this leads to the 
conclusion that the unjust situation of developing countries and its origins give rise to 
responsibilities to correct the injustices and improve the background conditions of the workers 
who make our goods. How to cash out these responsibilities is a difficult question, yet that again 
is no reason why it should be ignored. 
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